

THE AUTHORITY OF THE BRIMOB UNIT OF THE BALI REGIONAL POLICE IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTS OF TERRORISM CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE BALI REGIONAL POLICE

Erikson Sihotang¹
Universitas Mahendradatta

Kadek Adi Sugiarta²
Universitas Mahendradatta

Komang Edy Dharma Saputra³
Universitas Mahendradatta

Correspondence : Erikson Sihotang (eriksonsihotang1@gmail.com)

Submitted : 08-05-2025, Accepted : 09-06-2025, Published : 11-07-2025

Abstract

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, having existed in international politics since the 19th century. Initially, terrorism was small-scale and local, with select targets and within the framework of low-intensity conflict. Generally, acts of terrorism are closely related to a country's domestic stability. Terrorism has developed into an organized and global network, with terrorist groups operating in various countries controlled or co-opted by an international terrorist network. The research questions raised in this study are: 1. What is the authority of the sub-den of the Bali Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) terror detachment in prosecuting terrorism suspects within its jurisdiction? 2. What are the obstacles to the sub-den of the Bali Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) terror detachment in prosecuting terrorism suspects within its jurisdiction? The type of research used in this study is normative legal research. The results of the research are that the authority of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) in dealing with acts of terrorism is based on the duties and functions of Brimob based on the legal basis of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Republic of Indonesia National Police, namely implementing and deploying the strength of the Indonesian National Police Mobile Brigade to deal with high levels of public order and security disturbances, especially mass riots, organized crimes involving firearms, bombs, chemical, biological and radioactive materials, and Brimob's obstacles in dealing with acts of terrorism consist of internal factors, limited capabilities of Jibom unit personnel.

Keywords: Terrorism, Bali Police, Crime

Introduction

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is a state based on law (Rechtsstaat), not power (machstaat). As enacted in Article 1, paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states: "The State of Indonesia is a State based on law." The logical consequence of a state based on law is that every action taken by both the public and law enforcement officers must comply with the essential norms contained therein. These norms are the legal norms applicable in Indonesia.

Law, as a norm or set of rules, exists to create justice for the public. This means that law was created as an effort to regulate the behavior of the public and all kinds of actions by law enforcement officers, thereby creating order and regularity in society, ultimately leading to the upholding of the rule of law (justice).

As a state based on law, every action taken by the public and law enforcement officers must comply with the regulations applicable in Indonesia. This aims to prevent violations of human rights law for every individual. Law enforcement officers, specifically the Gegana (Terror Squad) of the Bali Regional Police Mobile Brigade Corps (Satbrimob), as part of the law enforcement apparatus tasked with protecting, serving, and serving the public, are at the forefront of combating and preventing all forms of crime, including terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in international politics since the 19th century. Initially, terrorism was small-scale and local, with select targets and within the framework of low-intensity conflict. Generally, acts of terrorism are closely linked to a country's domestic stability.

Terrorism has evolved into a global organization and network, where terrorist groups operating in various countries have been controlled or co-opted by an international terrorist network, and have established relationships and working mechanisms that are similar to each other, both in operational infrastructure and support infrastructure.

Terrorism has occurred repeatedly in Indonesia. There were several terror incidents that occurred in 2002, for example the Bali Bombing I on October 12, 2002 occurred at the Sari Club and Peddy's Club, the bomb explosion at the JW Marriot in 2003, the bomb in front of the Australian Embassy in 2004, the Bali bomb II in 2005, and a group of terrorist training in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. Until then the Special Detachment 88 anti-terror Police shot dead Noordin M. Top in Temanggung on August 8, 2009. Indonesia was again threatened with a bomb explosion that rocked two hotels JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton on July 17, 2009 in the Kuningan Business District of Jakarta. After that in 2010 there was a robbery at the CIMB

Niaga bank in North Sumatra on August 18, 2010 where the perpetrators of the bank robbery were linked to a network of terrorist organizations in terms of funding terrorist operations. Last January, the 2016 Jakarta Attack occurred. The 2016 Jakarta Attack was a series of events involving at least six explosions and a shooting in the area around Plaza Sarinah, Jakarta, on January 14, 2016. Seven people were involved in the attacks, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility. On February 2, 2016, a terrorist named Edi Santoso was arrested in Bandar Lampung. Edi had previously committed a robbery at BRI Gadingrejo in Pringsewu. He used the proceeds to fund the terrorist activities of the MIB (West Indonesia Mujahideen). Several other terrorists have also been arrested in Lampung. This is likely due to Lampung's location on the Trans-Sumatra highway, making it easy for terrorists to travel and hide. With the current several cases of terrorism as well as the existence of bomb terror, it seems necessary to address it, in revealing cases of terrorist crimes and bomb cases in Indonesia, the Chief of Police immediately formed a Special Force that could handle all terror threats including bomb terror, then the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror was created, some of the members of this special force are also Gegana Team Troops who are experts in the field of Explosives and Chemical Substances. The main task of this Special Force is designed as an Anti-Terrorism Unit that is able to overcome all kinds of bomb terror to hostage taking.

Methods

The type of research used in this research is normative legal research, namely by conducting research through discussions with concepts contained in the library materials used and statutory regulations as a legal basis for solving problems..

Results and Discussion

The authority of the subden of terrorism detachment of the Gegana Brimob unit of the Bali Regional Police in prosecuting suspects of terrorism crimes in the jurisdiction of the Bali Regional Police.

According to Heny Sulistiya, a Widyaiswara of the Indonesian National Police's Sespinti (Higher Leadership Coordination Unit), the legal basis or law clearly stipulates criminal sanctions for terrorism suspects in terrorism cases. The authority of the police, specifically the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob), as the high-level security controller, differs from that of other police units, such as the detective unit, which investigates criminal cases in a structured manner, then prosecutes them in court and issues sentences. The duties and functions of Brimob, based on the legal basis of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, include implementing and deploying Brimob's strength to address high-level disturbances to public order and security, particularly mass riots, organized crime involving firearms, bombs, chemical, biological, and radioactive materials, along with other police operational elements, to maintain law and order and public order throughout the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia, and to carry out other assigned duties.

This task formulation explicitly clarifies that Brimob has the authority to address acts of terrorism committed by perpetrators of terrorist crimes. Terrorism is a serious threat to public order and security, and requires specially trained and educated personnel to address these serious domestic security issues and ensure public safety. These personnel are supported by well-trained personnel with solid leadership, equipped with modern technology, and equipped with modern equipment.

Within its authority, the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) is tasked with taking action against perpetrators of high-level crimes, particularly mass riots, organized crime involving firearms, bombs, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and radioactive materials, in order to maintain law and order and public peace throughout the

jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia. Brimob is authorized to assist other police functions, protect police officers and the public under threat, and replace police officers in regional units when the situation or target of the task force leads to high-level crimes.

According to Made Palguna Wijaya, Head of the Densus 88 Anti-Terror Task Force, Brimob's capabilities are standardized in countering terrorism, divided into several divisions: the vanguard, the search and rescue (SAR), the bomb squad (Gegana), and the Brimob intelligence unit. While each Brimob unit plays a role in high-intensity control, the Gegana unit is a smaller unit specifically responsible for handling terrorism cases.

Brimob personnel are assigned to bomb threats and chemical bombs that pose a direct or indirect threat, in accordance with procedures for sterilization and disposal of chemical bombs. Brimob's high-intensity countermeasures against terrorism are specifically directed by the terrorism unit, as regulated in Article 3, paragraph 3b, No. 1a, of the Brimob's body posture, which outlines the duties of the terrorism unit.

A detailed overview of the Brimob Unit's workflow, part of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), explains the Brimob Unit's work cycle in combating terrorist crimes. The Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) is a crucial component of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), with a dominant role in crime prevention. This unit is viewed by the nation's leaders as a tool to assist in crime prevention, in accordance with general guidelines for providing information and officially monitoring all community activities.

The counterterrorism efforts of the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) Gegana, in accordance with the organization of the Indonesian National Police (Polri), were designed to be centralized following the enactment of Law Number 2 of 2002. This was intended to ensure effective coordination between higher-level and lower-level units, as there was a single unit that could bridge the gap. However, this approach also has its drawbacks, including the emergence of a lengthy and convoluted bureaucracy in the administrative process, a lack of responsiveness to local demands, vulnerability to politicization by national authorities, resulting

in the police institution's lack of role in the public interest, and a lack of flexibility in responding to societal changes.

2.140 / 5.000

For the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the public is not only the person to whom they provide services (police services), but also the person to whom they are accountable. Legal accountability, particularly for the use of physical force by individual police officers, and the inherent responsibility of the police force, certainly do not negate public accountability. Public accountability of the police is crucial, given that police work is fraught with discretionary authority and coercive measures, even involving lives, which are difficult to control (low visibility). Article 8 Paragraph (1) of Law Number 2 of 2002, which establishes the position of the Polri directly under the President, clearly opens the door to the possibility of the police being used as a tool for the President's political interests or becoming a force monopolizing the use of violence politically, rather than legally. Furthermore, the authority granted to the Polri in Law Number 2 of 2002 (Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18) appears to grant them extremely broad authority in carrying out their duties. If this is not balanced by strong public oversight, the potential for abuse of power is significant. In many democratic countries, the existence of an external oversight is an absolute prerequisite for correcting, directing, and developing the police force to become a professional organization dedicated to the public interest. According to Ketut Narsa, Head of the Bali Regional Police Mobile Brigade's (Brimob) Terror Sub-Detachment, based on law enforcement theory, the Bali Regional Police Mobile Brigade's (Brimob) Gegana Detachment has, based on its functions and roles, enforced the law in combating terrorism, specifically in the context of bomb defusing. This law enforcement effort involves identifying the type of bomb and disposing of it to minimize casualties.

Obstacles faced by the Bali Regional Police Mobile Brigade's (Brimob) Terror Sub-Detachment in prosecuting terrorism suspects within its jurisdiction

Acts of terrorism that have occurred in Indonesia are classified as serious and/or extraordinary crimes against humanity, state security, and state sovereignty, as well as against various aspects of social, national, and state life. Therefore, countering acts of terrorism requires a continuous, targeted, and integrated approach, encompassing prevention and eradication to maintain a safe, peaceful, and prosperous life based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945).

The series of incidents involving Indonesian citizens joining certain radical organizations designated as terrorist organizations or groups, or other organizations intending to carry out criminal conspiracy leading to acts of terrorism, both domestically and internationally, has created public fear and impacted political, economic, socio-cultural, security and public order, and international relations. Certain radical organizations that engage in acts of terrorism constitute transnational, organized crime with extensive networks that have clearly given rise to massive acts of terrorism. If not addressed immediately, they threaten peace and security, both nationally and internationally.

Terrorism is regulated by Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law (the Terrorism Law). The Terrorism Law was enacted in response to a pressing need, namely a series of bombings in the Republic of Indonesia, such as the Bali bombing and the Marriott bombing in 2003. These incidents had instilled widespread fear in the public, resulting in loss of life and property damage, thus negatively impacting Indonesia's social, economic, and political life, as well as its relations with the international community. These bombings are a common tactic employed by terrorists in several countries.

More specifically, the Bomb Disposal Unit (Subden 2 Jibom) under the Gegana Detachment of the Bali Police Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob). As its name suggests, this unit

is tasked with defusing bomb threats, which are typically used by terrorists to spread terror and intimidate the public.

The Bomb Disposal Unit, under the Gegana Detachment of the Bali Police Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob), faces various internal and external obstacles and constraints in carrying out its duties, which can disrupt its effectiveness.

The obstacles faced by the Gegana Detachment of the Bali Police Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) in responding to bomb threats in its service to the public, according to the concept of prime service, according to informants, are the A6 concept, which aligns the following factors:

1. Ability is the specific knowledge and skills absolutely necessary to support a prime service program. Based on research results, the capabilities of Jibom unit members are still very limited because of the 37 Jibom unit members who have attended training, only 8 have received training. There is a lack of service experience because most Jibom unit members still hold the rank of Bripta or Bripta, with an average of only 4-5 years of service.
2. Attitude is the behavior or disposition that must be emphasized when dealing with customers. The attitude of Jibom unit members who obey and comply with regulations, discipline, and orderliness in carrying out activities are supporting factors in improving problem management. However, public complaints about the lack of communication of Jibom unit members will affect service quality, as an uncommunicative attitude will appear arrogant and make the public unsympathetic.
3. Appearance is a person's appearance, both physical and non-physical, that can reflect self-confidence and credibility to others. The uniformed appearance of members demonstrates neatness and adherence to Gampol regulations, which will lead to public sympathy. However, a fearful appearance, lacking a smile or greeting, by members of the Bomb Squad will instill fear in the public.
4. Attention: Full concern for customers, both in terms of addressing customer needs and desires and understanding suggestions and criticism. The Bomb Squad's visit to the scene of

a bomb threat demonstrates concern and is highly anticipated by the public. However, because people today expect prompt service, long delays in arriving at the scene create anxiety, leading them to perceive the Bomb Squad as less responsive.

5. Action: The various concrete activities that must be undertaken to provide service to customers. The Bomb Squad's serious sterilization/inspection of the bomb threat scene, the proper use of equipment, and the sincere use of their abilities will ensure public satisfaction. However, the Bomb Squad's visit to the scene with a force of five personnel, resulting in a lengthy inspection. This has created public anxiety and doubt regarding the Bomb Squad's approach.
6. Accountability. Accountability is an attitude of siding with customers as a form of concern to avoid or minimize losses or customer dissatisfaction. By not damaging the crime scene and maintaining order, and not intimidating the public during sterilization or inspections, the Bomb Squad does not harm the community.

Hindering factors include:

1. Internal
 - a. The number of personnel in the Bomb Squad of the Bali Police's Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimobda) is sufficient, but the organization of its activities is not based on the interests of its core duties. This means that the Bomb Squad prioritizes external tasks such as escorting VIPs and securing vital objects, resulting in teams of only 4-5 personnel carrying out bomb threat management tasks. This hampers service delivery.
 - b. The limited capabilities of Bomb Squad personnel hinder the implementation of their duties, particularly in mastering the necessary procedures and using sophisticated equipment. This is because not all members of the Bomb Squad (Jimbom) unit, the Gegana Detachment, Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimobda) of the Bali Regional Police, have received vocational training related to their duties and have limited experience on duty. This is indicated by

research showing that almost all personnel have only been on duty for 2-5 years, as they still hold the rank of Brigadier (Bripda) or Brigadier (Briptu).

- c. Vital equipment is damaged and has not been replaced. The damage to some equipment is due to the lack of maintenance funds for the Jibom unit. This is based on interviews with Jibom unit members who complained that requests for equipment replacement and repairs have been submitted but have not yet been realized.
- d. The communication equipment (HT) used by the Bali Regional Police's Brimobda Unit, specifically the Jibom unit, cannot access or connect to the HT frequency used by the Bali Regional Police. This hinders coordination between the Bali Regional Police's Brimobda Unit and the Bali Regional Police.
- e. There is no Densus Work Unit in the North Sumatra Regional Police, which only exists regionally, making communication difficult to identify specific terrorist networks and those with bomb-making capabilities.

2. External factors include:

- a. Traffic congestion and frequent traffic jams, especially when people are going to and from work. This clearly hinders the movement of the Bomb Squad to the scene of a bomb threat.
- b. The Bali Regional Police jurisdiction consists of numerous regional units/police precincts, making it difficult for the Bomb Squad to provide backup for these areas. The Bomb Squad only consists of four teams that rotate on standby or are on call daily. The four teams are disproportionate to the area's size, population, and the number of bomb threats, significantly impacting the response and quality of the Bomb Squad's service to the public.
- c. The locations targeted by bomb threats are always large and consist of many rooms, and some buildings lack sketches/floor plans, resulting in lengthy inspections and sterilization. Considering the limited number of Bomb Squad personnel on duty and the limited equipment used, the speed of inspections at the scene of a bomb threat, which covers a very large area, is not commensurate with the speed of investigation.

- d. The building owner's lack of coordination, who refused to permit inspections of certain areas or rooms, hampered the task of handling bomb threats.
- e. Not all security guards, particularly those assigned to strategic locations, received bomb threat anticipation training, placing a heavy workload on the Bomb Squad, which consists of only four personnel, who inspected a fairly large crime scene.
- f. Lack of public awareness of radical ideology and the actions taken by the public in the event of a bomb threat.
- g. Internet sites still exist that display instructions for making firecrackers and explosive materials for fish bombs and similar products, which serve as references for bombers.

Conclusion

1. The authority of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) in handling Terrorism Crimes is based on the duties and functions of Brimob based on the legal basis of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Republic of Indonesia National Police, namely implementing and deploying the strength of the Indonesian National Police Mobile Brigade to overcome high-level public order disturbances, especially mass riots, organized crimes involving firearms, bombs, chemical, biological and radioactive materials together with other police operational implementing elements to realize legal order and public peace throughout the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia and other tasks assigned to it. Brimob is authorized to assist other police functions, Protect Police members as well as the public who are under threat and Replace Police duties in Regional Units if the situation or target of the task has led to high-level crimes.
2. Brimob's obstacles in dealing with terrorism crimes consist of internal factors, namely the limited capabilities of the Jibom unit personnel which will hinder the implementation of tasks: 1. Vital equipment is damaged and there has been no replacement of equipment, 2. external factors, namely vehicle density and frequent traffic jams, 3. The jurisdiction of the Bali Regional Police consists of many regional units, so the Jibom unit will experience difficulties in backing up the jurisdiction, 3. Locations targeted by bomb terror threats are always large places and consist of many rooms and there are buildings that do not have sketches/building plans, so it will take a long time to carry out inspections and sterilization..

References

Book :

- H.R. Abdussalam, 2009, *Hukum Kepolisian Sebagai Hukum Positif dalam Disiplin Hukum*, Restu Agung, Jakarta.
- Hazairin dalam Wasito Hadi Utomo, 2012, *Hukum Kepolisian di Indonesia*, LPIP, Yogyakarta.
- Khunthi Dyah Wardani, 2007, *Impeachment dalam Ketatanegaraan Indonesia*, UII Press, Yogyakarta.
- Moch Faisal Salam, 2013, *Motivasi Tindakan Terorisme*, Mandar Maju, Jakarta.
- Poltak Dedy, 2007, *Kinerja Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Polri) Dalam Memberantas Tindak Pidana Terorisme*, Erlangga, Jakarta.
- Pudi Rahardi, 2012, *Hukum Kepolisian, Kemandirian, Profesionalisme dan Reformasi Polri*, Laksbang Grafika, Surabaya.

Informant :

- AKP Ketut Narsa, S.H Kepala Subden Wanteror Brimobda Bali.
- AKP Ketut Narsa, S.H Kepala Subden Wanteror Brimobda Bali.
- AKP Made Palguna Wijaya, S.IK, Kepala Wilayah Tugas Satuan Densus 88 Anti Teror.
- AKP Ketut Narsa, S.H Kepala Subden Wanteror Brimobda Bali.
- Heny Sulistiya, Widyaaiswara Sespimti Polri.

Law :

- Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945;
- Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP);
- Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2002 Nomor 2, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4168.
- Undang-Undang Nomor 5 tahun 2018 tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 15 tahun 2003 tentang Penetapan Perppu 1 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2018 Nomor 92, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 6216.
- Undang-Undang No. 13 Tahun 2022 tentang Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2022 Nomor 143, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 6801.
- .